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Bona Fide Purchase for Value
Plaintiffs brought claim and delivery proceeding in Good-
win v. Harrison1 to recover an automobile. The evidence
briefly was to the effect that plaintiffs had sold the automo-
bile in question to A, taking a chattel mortgage for the unpaid
balance. Before the mortgage was recorded in the county of
the mortgagor's residence, A sold the automobile for value
to B who in turn sold it to the defendant. At the trial defend-
ant asked that an instruction be given to the jury that the
equities of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
passed on to a subsequent purchaser. The court refused the
instruction, but upon motion for a new trial after verdict
was returned for the plaintiffs, granted the motion saying
that the instruction should have been given.
Our Supreme Court, after reviewing several cases on the
subject, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum2 and stated that
the rule was there well stated. It is as follows:
"After property has passed into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser, every subsequent purchaser stands in the shoes of
such bona fide purchaser and is entitled to the same protection
as the bona fide purchaser, irrespective of notice, unless such
purchaser was a former purchaser, with notice, of the same
property prior to its sale to the bona fide purchaser."
In addition the Court held that although this was an equi-
table rule, it was also applicable to cases arising under the
recording statutes. Under such circumstances the issue is
simply a legal one.
Setting Aside of Deed
White v. Livingston3 was an action to set aside a deed for
fraud in its execution. The case was referred to a special
referee who rendered a report favorable to the defendant.
Exceptions to the report were filed by the plaintiff, one being
*Member of the firm of Urner, Farlow & McCrackin, Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina. A.B., 1951, Wofford College; LL.B., 1955, University of
South Carolina.
1. 231 S. C. 243, 98 S. E. 2d 255 (1967).
2. 77 C. J. S., Sales § 296d (1952).
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that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the deed
was an equitable mortgage. However, plaintiff did not ex-
cept to that portion of the report that the action was ", . . for
the purpose of setting aside a deed on the grounds of fraud."
The lower court approved the report of the referee, stating
that under section 10-1412 of the Code (pertaining to excep-
tions to a referee's decision), " . . .an important limitation
on the right of review requires adherence to the theory on
which the case was tried below.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
and emphasized that pointed out just above. It also held that
Section 10-1412 was applicable to equity as well as law cases.
Indemnity
An indemnity agreement was involved in L. B. Price Mer-
cantile Co. v. Redd.4 The defendant in a written instrument
agreed to reimburse a bonding company ". . . for any loss up to
Two Hundred ($200.00) which may occur by reason of any
dishonest act of the said applicant and also to pay the L. B.
Price Mercantile Co. any amount that may be due and owing
it by the applicant but our aggregate liability hereunder shall
be limited to $200.00." (Italics added.) A judgment was ob-
tained against the applicant for monies had and received in
the amount of $262.25. Then action was commenced against
the defendant herein. The case was proved by the former
judgment roll, and a directed verdict for $200.00 was ob-
tained.
The defendant appealed alleging that the trial judge was in
error in holding the former judgment conclusive of appellant's
liability under the indemnity agreement. The Supreme Court
pointed out the two distinct obligations under the agreement
as emphasized above and affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Whether the judgment was conclusive or only prima
facie evidence of the liability of the defendant was of no con-
sequence since the only ground upon which it was opposed
was that the debt which it represented had not arisen from
a dishonest act on the applicant's part. The agreement was not
this narrow as will be seen by examining the applicable por-
tions above.
4. 231 S. C. 446, 99 S. E. 2d 57 (1957).
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Bankruptcy - Voidable Preference
Within four months of bankruptcy of the debtor, and the
creditor knowing that it was insolvent, the creditor recorded
several chattel mortgages which it had received previously
and repossessed the chattels on which the mortgages were
given. The trustee thereupon brought an action to compel
the creditor to account for the value of the chattels repos-
sessed on the ground that the repossession of the chattels -
the mortgages not having been recorded prior to four months
before bankruptcy - constituted a voidable preference under
section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.5 The referee in bankruptcy
so found, his report being adopted as the opinion of the dis-
trict court.6 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, 7 the lower court decision was affirmed in an opinion by
Judge Haynsworth who stated:
. . . Whatever interest in the chattels became vested
in the finance company, it was referable to the chattel
mortgages and was derived from the bankrupt. The
transfer of that title or interest was not complete within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, until the mortgages
were recorded. 11 U.S.C.A. Section 96, sub. a (2).
... Under [this section] the transfers of the security
can be deemed to have been not earlier than the recording
dates. The transfers thus accomplished in May 1954, on
the dates on which the mortgages were recorded, were
made on account of antecedent debts which arose contem-
poraneously with the earlier execution and delivery of the
mortgages.., all of the elements of a preferential trans-
fer are present.
Recording Act
South Carolina's recording statute8 was again considered in
South Carolina National Bank v. Guest.9 Briefly the facts
were that the defendant bank without notice took a chattel
mortgage on an automobile after the plaintiff received a sim-
ilar mortgage but before the plaintiff's mortgage was re-
corded. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial
5. 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1952).
6. Tyson v. National Discount Corporation, 149 F. Supp. 592 (E. D.
S. C. 1957).
7. National Discount Corporation v. Tyson, 257 F. 2d 18 (4th Cir.
1957).
8. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 60-101.
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court in holding that defendant bank's mortgage was a prior
lien on the automobile since the recording act states that such
an instrument " . . shall be valid so as to affect the rights
of subsequent creditors (whether lien creditors or simple
contract creditors) or purchases for valuable consideration
without notice only from the day and hour when they are
recorded ...."
Effects of Compromise by Mortgagor with Tortfeasor After
Notice by Mortgagee
In Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Trapp10 an attempt
was made to recover damages on a peculiar theory. It was
an action by a chattel mortgagee against a defendant tort-
feasor and his liability insurer for settling a tort action with
the mortgagor after the mortgagee had given the parties
notice. The release was for claims for personal injuries and
damage to the automobile, subject of the chattel mortgage.
Judgment of nonsuit was ordered by the trial court at the
end of plaintiff's evidence based on three grounds, the first
being that there was no legal duty resting upon the defendant
insurance company to do anything concerning the alleged right
of plaintiff.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Stukes,
affirmed the trial judge stating, "Nonsuit was affirmed and
the Court said, as we conclude here: 'The defendant was under
no legal duty to protect the plaintiffs, and assumed no obliga-
tion to do so. There was no evidence of fraud or collusion.
So that neither in contract nor in tort are plaintiffs entitled
to maintain their action against the Casualty Company (the
tortfeasor's insurer).'" (Emphasis added.)
10. 232 S. C. 297, 101 S. E. 2d 829 (1958).
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